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Using the tools developed for statistical physics, we simultaneously analyze statistical properties
of the Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange indices. In spite of the small number of data used
in the analysis, the result shows the universal behavior of complex systems previously found in the
leading stock indices. We also analyze their features before and after the financial crisis. We found
that after the crisis both stocks do not show a same statistical behavior. The impact of currency
controls is observed in the distribution of index returns.
PACS numbers: 05.40.Fb, 05.45.Tp, 89.90.+n
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there have been considerable efforts to an-
alyze financial data by means of methods developed for
statistical physics [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14]. Motivated by the scientific challenge to understand
the nature of complex systems, physicists have started
to direct their attentions to a huge, and also growing
amount of economics data recorded minutes by minutes
for decades. Among these interesting data, the fluctua-
tion of stock exchange indices is of special interest, since
it might indirectly reflect the economic situation in a
certain region and some people happily speculate their
money on it. Furthermore, the advancement in com-
puting capabilities has enabled them to handle a large
amount of data, unlike almost 40 years ago when Man-
delbrot investigated approximately 2000 data points of
cotton prices [15].
It is then expected that such studies could explain the
nature of interacting elements in the complex system and,
therefore, could help to forecast economic fluctuations in
the future. In other words, these studies were intended
to produce new results in economics, which might help us
to avoid economic “earthquakes” such as what happened
in Indonesia a few years ago [16].
Previous studies in this subject so far have focused only
on the long-term behavior of the leading stock indices.
This is understandable, since to statistically investigate
the universal features in economic activities one has to
have a large amount of data. Very little attentions are
given to investigate what happen to the stock markets
in developing countries (e.g., Indonesia) as well as what
happen to the stock indices before, during, and after a
financial (or monetary) crash, although in the latter the
most important ingredients of the financial market or eco-
nomic fluctuation could exist [10, 11, 12].
It is the objective of this paper to study the general
statistical properties of the fluctuation in stock indices
in two developing countries, as well as their properties
before and after a financial crashes. This study is impor-
tant in order to investigate the extent of the universal-
ity of complex behavior found previously in the leading
stock indices, such as S&P 500 and NYSE. Such investi-
gation will naturally shed important information on the
variation of the universal constants in the scaling behav-
ior of the stock index. With this information at hand
it is then possible to identify the statistical properties
that quantify different behaviors in stock markets and
those which indicate a crash or stable condition. For this
purpose we take two different indices, the Jakarta Stock
Exchange Index (abbreviated with IHSG, an acronym of
Indeks Harga Saham Gabungan or composite stock ex-
change price index) and the Kuala Lumpur Stock Ex-
change index (KLSE), which belong to different coun-
tries. Comparing the two indices would be very inter-
esting since both Indonesia and Malaysia underwent the
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FIG. 1: The Indonesian and Malaysian Gross Domestic Prod-
ucts along with their populations. The vertical line indicates
the year when the monetary and financial crisis started to oc-
cur in the Asia region. In both countries the financial crisis
was started on July 1997, the impact was naturally recorded
as the 1998 GDP. Data are taken from [17].
2same monetary crisis in 1997, which are then followed
by financial crashes in almost all economic sectors, but
with quite different economic situations. As has been of-
ten discussed, the behavior of two stock indices could be
very different although the two stock markets are situ-
ated in the same region.
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is worth to glance
at the Indonesian and Malaysian Gross Domestic Prod-
ucts (GDP) shown in Fig. 1. Before the crisis the growth
rate of the Indonesian GDP seems to be faster than that
of Malaysian GDP. The monetary crisis in 1997 has a
clear impact on both GDPs. Nevertheless, the impact
on Indonesian GDP is more obvious. After the crisis,
Malaysia was rather successful to stabilize its economic
situation and did not accept the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) prescription. Three years after that
Malaysia was able to put its GDP slightly above the
previous value in 1997. On the other hand, Indonesia
was unable to stop the declination of Rupiah against US
Dollar and decided to ask the IMF to help stabilizing
its monetary condition. Other crises, which followed the
monetary crisis, are blamed as the reasons of this.
II. GENERAL PROPERTIES
A. Time Series and Index Returns
In our analysis we investigate the daily index returns,
which are defined as
Z∆t(t) = ln Y (t+∆t)− lnY (t)
= ln [Y (t+∆t)/Y (t)], (1)
with Y (t) indicates the closing index of the stock at day
t. Some previous studies [6, 7] are performed with the re-
turn defined as the difference in the index, instead of the
difference in the logarithm of index as given by Eq. (1).
However, in our analysis we found that the results of
calculations by using both methods do not differ signifi-
cantly.
The available data for the IHSG index are the daily
closing index data recorded from January 1988 to April
2002 which consist of 3526 data points. The KLSE data
contain also the daily closing index starting from De-
cember 1993 and ending with June 2002, which comprise
totally 2104 data points. The number of data in both in-
dices seems to be the first obstacle in this analysis, since
compared with the previous analysis on the S&P 500 in-
dex, e.g. Ref. [9], which used approximately 5 × 106
data points, the number turns out to be extremely small.
However, as shown by Mandelbrot in his analysis on the
cotton prices, even with about 2000 data points it is still
possible to extract a quantitative conclusion from the
data.
Figure 2 shows the time series of the IHSG index along
with the logarithmic returns calculated by using Eq. (1).
It is naturally difficult to define when exactly the crisis
(or crash) started and when it finished. To get around
this difficulty, in Fig. 2 we also display the historical time
series of the exchange rate between 1000 Indonesian Ru-
piah and 1 US Dollar, since the economic crash started
with the decline of this rate. The available data do not fill
the entire range, nevertheless they are sufficient to locate
the period of the crisis. It should be noted that before
the monetary crisis the government intervention on this
exchange rate was very strong and as a consequence, al-
though the Rupiah was not pegged to US Dollar with a
fixed rate, the fluctuation in the exchange rate was rela-
tively tiny.
In Fig. 2 we indicate the period when Rupiah started
to continuously drop (10th July 1997) until it reached the
minimum point (23rd January 1998). The IHSG index
also dropped significantly during this period. However,
the index continued to strongly fluctuate and reached
another minimum about one year later due to the un-
fortunate political situation. The same phenomenon also
happened in the foreign exchange rate, though with a
different scale. In view of this, according to the IHSG in-
dex, the duration of financial crisis could be longer than
one year.
Figure 3 displays the historical time series of the KLSE
index along with their logarithmic returns and the ratio
between 1 Malaysian Ringgit and 1 US Dollar. Coin-
cidentally, our definition of the crash period fits nicely
with the latter. As in the case of IHSG, the KLSE in-
dex also significantly dropped during this period. The
difference between Indonesian and Malaysian foreign ex-
change rate is, nevertheless, apparent here, since on 1st
September 1998 Malaysia imposed currency controls, the
Ringgit was pegged with US Dollar with a fixed rate of
3.80 Ringgit per Dollar, while Indonesia was unable to do
that due to the multi-crisis that simultaneously occurred
in this country. From Fig. 3 it is not clear whether or not
such policy helped to elevate the KLSE index, since com-
paring with the IHSG fluctuation in Fig. 2 the two indices
seem to be strongly correlated, thus other external fac-
tors could be more relevant to explain the improvement
in the KLSE index. In fact, Ref. [18] claims that the pol-
icy has led to a misposition of the Ringgit relative to
its realistic exchange rate. During 1999 the Ringgit was
overvalued since the regional currencies such as Japan
Yen and Singapore Dollar have all depreciated against
US Dollar. As a consequence, Malaysian export became
less competitive and eventually this policy led to an eco-
nomic slowdown in Malaysia.
A quick glance to the index fluctuation Y (t) in both
figures reveals that the fluctuation is more dramatic than
that of S&P 500, indicating that in this case the situa-
tion is more complex. After the crash the magnitude of
returns Z(t) is obviously larger in both indices, or, in the
economics language, the probability to gain or to loose
becomes larger than before. In the next section, it will
be shown that both indices are clearly more volatile after
the crash.
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FIG. 2: The ratio between 1000 Indonesian Rupiah and 1
US Dollar (top), the Jakarta Stock Exchange Index (IHSG)
Y (t) (middle) and the logarithmic return Z(t) calculated from
Eq. (1) as a function of time t sampled with ∆t = 1 day
(bottom). The arrow in the middle panel indicates the lowest
value position of Y (t) in 1998. Two vertical dashed lines in
the figure define the crash period during which the Rupiah
exchange rates dropped significantly relative to US Dollar.
Data are taken from [19] (IDR/USD exchange rate) and [20]
(IHSG stock index).
B. Scaling the Index Returns
Following previous studies [6, 7] we investigate the
probability density function (PDF or P (Z)) of the re-
turn to the origin P (0) in order to investigate the scaling
behavior of the IHSG and KLSE index returns. The ad-
vantage of such analysis is obvious, since the number of
data included is relatively small, while the probability is
largest at Z = 0, thus reducing the statistical inaccura-
cies.
Starting with the characteristic function [7]
ϕ(∆t) = e−γ∆t|q|
α
, (2)
the Le´vy stable distribution is given by
P (Z) =
1
pi
∫ ∞
0
e−γ∆t|q|
α
cos(qZ) dq . (3)
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FIG. 3: The ratio between 1 Malaysian Ringgit and 1 US Dol-
lar (top), the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Index (IHSG)
Y (t) (middle) and the logarithmic return Z(t) (bottom) as
a function of time sampled for ∆t = 1 day. On 1st Septem-
ber 1998 Malaysia imposed currency controls, the Ringgit was
pegged with US Dollar with a fixed rate of 3.80 Ringgit per
Dollar. Data are taken from [19] (RM/USD exchange rate)
and [21] (KLSE stock index). Everything else is as in Fig. 2.
From Eq. (3) the probability of return to the origin P (0)
reads
P (0) =
Γ(1/α)
piα(γ∆t)1/α
, (4)
where Γ indicates the Gamma function.
The log-log plots of P (0) as a function of the sampling
time ∆t for both IHSG and KLSE indices are shown in
the left panels of Fig. 4. Since the number of data points
is relatively small we limit our analysis only up to ∆t =
19 days for the IHSG index and ∆t = 13 days for KLSE.
In the former (latter) case the number of data points in
each set decreases from 3526 (2104) for ∆t = 1 day to the
value of 181 for ∆t = 19 days (160 for ∆t = 13 days).
These values are already much smaller compared with
previous analyses, e.g., for the Hang Seng index [14] one
ends up with the value of 1481 for ∆t = 128 minutes.
The slopes of linear regressions to these plots equal the
negative inverse of the Le´vy stable distribution indices α.
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FIG. 4: Left panels: Log-log plots of the IHSG (top) and
KLSE (bottom) probability of return to the origin as a func-
tion of the sampling time ∆t. Solid curves show linear re-
gressions to this probability. The dashed curve in the case of
KLSE shows another possibility if one uses only the first three
points in the linear regression, whereas the dotted curve is a
linear regression by excluding the first point (∆t = 1). The
slopes of these lines, which are equal to negative inverse of the
Le´vy stable distribution indices, are shown in the left panels.
Right panels: Comparison between normalized distribution
functions for ∆t = 1 and normalized Le´vy stable distribu-
tions (solid and dashed lines) with parameters obtained from
the left figures. The standard deviation and the number of
data are shown in the right panels.
Using this index we calculate the parameter γ by means
of Eq. (4) and plot the “theoretical” PDF as a function
of normalized returns Z/σ, using Eq. (3), where σ the
standard deviation of the distribution, and compare it
with the empirical PDF obtained from data in the right
panels of Fig. 4. All relevant parameters obtained in this
calculation are displayed in Table I.
In the IHSG case we obtain m = −0.7374 (corresponds
to α = 1.3561) which is slightly smaller than that of
the S&P 500 index obtained from the same analysis [7]
(α = 1.40), or using different approach [9] ( α = 1.60 –
3.45). The value is also smaller than the result obtained
for Hang Seng index (α = 1.619) [14]. The value indicates
that the central part of the IHSG distribution can be
described by a Le´vy stable process.
In the KLSE case the situation is rather different as
depicted by the bottom panel of Fig. 4. The PDF at zero
return shows a cross-over at ∆t between 1 and 2 and,
as a consequence, as shown by the solid line the linear
regression to the points does not lead to a satisfactory
result. To clarify this, we use the three first points in the
second regression and excluding the P (Z = 0,∆t = 1)
data point in the third one. The results are compared
with the linear regression to all points in the bottom-left
panel of Fig. 4. In the first case we obtain α = 1.7433,
already close to a Gaussian distribution although still
within the Le´vy stable index. In the second case the
index α is smaller, indicating that the distribution for
small ∆t is far from Gaussian. However, in the third case
the distribution is already a Gaussian unstable process.
From this result, clearly we can conclude that by slightly
increasing ∆t the KLSE index does not retain its power
law and quickly converges to a Gaussian distribution, in
contrast to the IHSG index. The PDF behavior for the
three cases is clearly seen in the bottom-right panel of
Fig. 4.
The standard deviation σ is known as the historical
volatility in financial literatures and quantifies the risk
associated with the corresponding stock [23]. As shown
in the first line of Table I, the KLSE stock is slightly
riskier than the IHSG one. The kurtosis measures the
relative peakedness of the distribution to a Gaussian one.
The PDF of the less capitalized stocks is more leptokur-
tic than the PDF of the more capitalized ones [23]. From
Table I we can clearly see that the IHSG stock is less
capitalized than KLSE. Finally, the skewness character-
izes the degree of asymmetry of the distribution from its
mean. A positive value of skewness indicates that the
stock delivered more profits along its history, whereas a
negative value displays more losses hit the investor. Ta-
ble I reveals that the IHSG stock in general gives more
profits than the KLSE one.
Although numerical values given in Table I could be in-
teresting, the values become much more important when
we discuss the behavior of the stock indices before and
after the financial crash in the next section.
To further explore statistical properties of the PDF
of index returns we follow Refs. [6, 7], i.e. we investigate
the stability of the distribution for ∆t > 1 day. Assuming
the central part of the distribution can be described by a
Le´vy stable distribution, then using the scaling variables
P ′(Z) = P (Z)(∆t)1/α (5)
and
Z ′(t) =
Z(t)
(∆t)1/α
, (6)
the empirical PDFs for different time sampling ∆t will
collapse onto the ∆t = 1 distribution.
The results for both indices are displayed in Fig. 5,
where we perform the analysis for ∆t < 20 days. In gen-
eral the data collapse is evident, especially in the case of
IHSG. In the KLSE case we use α = 1.7433 (result from
regression to all empirical P (0) in Fig. 4), since the value
leads to an average behavior. As Ref. [14] has reported,
we also find that the extent of data collapse is stronger in
the center of the distribution. The existence of a cross-
over in the KLSE case is also observed here, the scaled
P ′(Z) are more scattered than that of the IHSG.
5TABLE I: Summary of general statistical properties of the IHSG and KLSE returns Z(t). Linear regression to the probability
density function at zero return PDF(0) as a function of ∆t shown in Fig. 4 yields a line y = mx+ n, where m = −1/α. The
standard deviation, kurtosis, and skewness are calculated using the formulas given in Ref. [22].
Properties IHSG KLSE
1 2 3
Standard deviation σ 0.0187 0.0196 0.0196 0.0196
Kurtosis 81.796 29.044 29.044 29.044
Skewness 3.3987 0.3888 0.3888 0.3888
m −0.7374 −0.5736 −1.0918 −0.4145
n 1.6020 1.4985 1.5914 1.3691
γ 1.383 × 10−3 1.787 × 10−4 1.240 × 10−2 6.433 × 10−6
α 1.3561 1.7433 0.9159 2.4125
N 3526 2104 2104 2104
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FIG. 5: Top panels: Probability density functions of the IHSG
and KLSE index returns for ∆t < 20 days. Bottom panels:
The same probability density functions, but plotted in scaled
units, using Eqs. (5) and (6). Inverse of the Le´vy stable dis-
tribution index is shown in bottom panels.
C. Moments
Reference [9] has pointed out that the use of the re-
turn probability to the origin PDF(0) to estimate the
Le´vy stable distribution index α is statistically not op-
timal, due to discreteness of the distribution. Instead of
exploiting such method, Ref. [9] used a different strategy,
i.e. calculating α by means of the slope of the cumulative
distribution tails in a log-log plot. To further test their
results on the scaling behavior, Refs. [8, 9] analyzed the
moments of the distribution of normalized returns
µ(k) = 〈 |g(t)|k〉 . (7)
where the normalized returns g(t) is defined by
g(t) =
Z(t)− 〈Z(t)〉
〈Z2(t)〉 − 〈Z(t)〉2
, (8)
with 〈Z(t)〉 the time average of Z(t) over the entire of
time series. In the case of the S&P 500 index the result
is found to be consistent with the analysis of the tails
of cumulative distributions. They pointed out that the
change in the moments behavior originates from the grad-
ual disappearance of the Le´vy slope in the distribution
tails. In our case it is also important to cross-check the
results shown in Fig. 4, especially the KLSE slope, which
is found to be non-linear in the range of ∆t = 1− 10.
It has been shown in Ref. [9] that Eq. (7) will diverge
for k ≥ 3. In this study we also constrain k within
0 ≤ k ≤ 3. The result for both indices compared with the
moment obtained from a Gaussian distribution are shown
in Fig. 6. Obviously the results are consistent with our
previous analysis, the IHSG moment retains its scaling up
to ∆t = 9 days, only after ∆t = 13 the moment starts to
deviate toward the Gaussian distribution. In the KLSE
case the moment quickly converges to the Gaussian dis-
tribution as ∆t increases from 1 day and does not show
any scaling behavior as in the former case.
D. Correlation in the stock index
Another interesting behavior of the stock index fluc-
tuation is its short and long time memories which are
usually expressed in terms of the autocorrelation. Un-
derstanding the power law in the correlation is very help-
ful in selecting the appropriate model or mechanism to
explain the fluctuation process. In Ref. [9] it has been
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FIG. 6: Moments of the distribution of normalized returns
given in Eq. (7) for ∆t = 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 13, and 19 days com-
pared with those obtained from the Gaussian distribution
(solid thick lines). In the IHSG case, except for ∆t = 13 and
19, all curves do not significantly deviate from the ∆t = 1
moment.
shown that the autocorrelation function of the S&P 500
returns exhibits an exponential decay with a characteris-
tic decay time of approximately 4 minutes, whereas the
absolute value of index returns shows a scaling behavior
with a power-law exponent of 0.3. In our case it is of
course difficult to study such behavior since both indices
are recorded daily. However, a qualitative comparison
between the two indices might help us to probe the dif-
ferences in the two stocks.
Following Ref. [9] the autocorrelation function is de-
fined as
C∆t(τ) =
〈Z∆t(t)Z∆t(t+ τ)〉 − 〈Z∆t(t)〉
2
〈Z2∆t(t)〉 − 〈Z∆t(t)〉
2
, (9)
where τ indicates the time lag. The result for short-
range autocorrelation is depicted in Fig. 7, where we can
observe that the IHSG stock is slightly more correlated
than the KLSE one. This result is certainly consistent
with the analysis of the scaling and moments behavior.
The fluctuation in the KLSE index seems to be more
random than that of IHSG, as can be seen also in Fig. 6.
The long-range autocorrelation function obtained by
calculating the absolute value of the return in Eq. (9)
is shown in Fig. 8. The absolute value of index returns
from both stocks show a long-range power law behavior
with a time scale up to almost one year. The only differ-
ence is observed in the power exponent of the scaling, the
IHSG correlation falls off faster than the KLSE one. This
is, however, in contrast to their short-range correlation.
Note that Refs. [4, 9] fitted the long-range autocorrela-
tion to the function in the form of a/(1 + τb) . In our
analysis we found no significant difference if we used such
function.
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to the power law in the form of a/(1 + τ b) leads to a similar
result.
E. How volatile are the two stocks?
Finally it is also interesting to see the volatility of the
two stocks. The volatility of the stock index is a measure
of how much the index is likely to fluctuate. Informa-
tion on the stock volatility is very important for investors
since it quantifies the risk factor and it is also an im-
portant input of the Black-Scholes option-pricing model.
There are many different definitions of the volatility in
financial literatures [24]. Here we define the volatility as
an average of the absolute return over a time window
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stock indices obtained by calculating Eq. (10) with n = 1
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with length n sampled with ∆t = 1 day,
v(t) =
1
n
t+n−1∑
τ=t
|Z(τ)| , (10)
with Z(τ) is given by Eq. (1).
The results are shown in Fig. 9. As can be estimated
from Figs. 2 and 3 volatility in both stock indices in-
creases after the financial crash. It is obvious that after
the drop of the foreign exchange rate finished in 23rd Jan-
uary 1998 volatilities of both indices are still large until
the indices reached their minimum values in September
1998. From that on, the volatility decreases gradually
although until 2002 the values are still larger than the
values before the crash.
It is also obvious from Fig. 9 that before 1997 the IHSG
stock had a rather stable volatility variation, while on the
other hand the variation in the KLSE case was already
dramatic. In general, the two stocks maintain these be-
haviors after the crash, although in this period the aver-
aged volatilities are larger than before. This might ex-
plain why the IHSG stock index is found to be more
correlated than the KLSE one.
III. STATISTICAL PROPERTIES BEFORE AND
AFTER CRASH
In section II we have shown that between July 1997 and
September 1998 the index returns of both stocks fluctuate
strongly. As shown in Fig. 9, compared with the situa-
tions before and after this period, both indices become
more volatile. A more quantitative description can be
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FIG. 10: Same as in Fig. 4 but for the IHSG case before,
during, and after the financial crash.
obtained from Table II, where in the first line we average
the index volatility over all times before 10th July 1997,
16 month after that (during which the volatility of both
indices is significantly large), and over the rest of data,
respectively. The result confirms the finding of Ref. [23],
namely the volatility of a stock index tends to be large
right after the crash and in a relatively long period after
that. This also happens to both stock indices, i.e. al-
most five years after the financial crisis both stocks are
still more volatile than before.
In the financial literature the volatility is often cal-
culated from the standard deviation of the returns dis-
tribution [24]. In Table II we also present the standard
deviations of the IHSG and KLSE index returns distri-
butions in all three cases. Table II indicates that both
definitions are consistent in our analysis.
From the kurtosis of stock indices we can see that the
IHSG stock is more capitalized after the crash, whereas
the KLSE stock displays a very different behavior. Never-
theless, the skewness of their distributions shows a similar
tendency, both stocks deliver less profits after the crash,
although more profits could be obtained from the KLSE
8TABLE II: Statistical properties of IHSG and KLSE stock indices before, during, and after crash.
IHSG KLSE
Properties
Before crash During crash After crash Before crash During crash After crash
Average volatility 0.0192 0.0327 0.0260 0.0219 0.0341 0.0237
Standard deviation σ 0.0167 0.0300 0.0185 0.0127 0.0323 0.0197
Kurtosis 183.421 2.849 4.377 6.775 8.152 42.925
Skewness 6.8706 0.1417 0.7079 0.2053 1.0644 −0.2529
γ 7.581 × 10−4 2.891 × 10−3 9.723 × 10−6 9.339 × 10−6 3.109 × 10−4 2.755 × 10−4
N 2347 296 883 889 284 993
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FIG. 11: As in Fig. 10, but for the KLSE stock index.
stock during the crash.
It is clearly tempting to investigate whether or not the
universal properties found in section II still exist in all
periods and to ask what kind of differences might quan-
tify these conditions. The answer can be found in Figs. 10
and 11. Obviously in all cases the statistical accuracies
are not as good as in the previous section, when we used
all data in our analyses. Nevertheless, in spite of the
very limited data points used in our analysis, the mes-
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FIG. 12: Moments of the distribution of IHSG normalized
returns before, during, and after crash.
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FIG. 13: Same as in Fig. 12, but for the KLSE index.
sage from Figs. 10 and 11 is clear, the universal properties
of the returns distribution retain their existences in all
cases. Linear regression to the IHSG probability of the
return to the origin reveals the fact that the distribution
turns from Le´vy to Gaussian after the crash. Surpris-
ingly, the KLSE stock index shows a contrary result, the
distribution alters from a Gaussian to a Le´vy one after
the crash.
A cross-check to the result shown in Figs. 10 and 11 is
inevitable, since the number of data could significantly
limit statistical accuracies in this case. For this purpose
in Figs. 12 and 13 we display the moments of both stock
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FIG. 14: Short range autocorrelation functions of the IHSG
and KLSE index returns before, during, and after crash.
indices in the case of before, during, and after the finan-
cial crash. A consistent result is obtained from these fig-
ures, in the case of IHSG the distribution becomes closer
to Gaussian during and after crash, whereas the KLSE
moments move away from the Gaussian distribution after
the crash.
Another important finding obtained from Fig. 12 is
that the scaling behavior up to ∆t = 9 shown by the
IHSG case in the previous section originates from the
period before crash. After the crash, the IHSG moments
quickly converge to a Gaussian distribution. In fact, this
phenomenon has already been seen in the left panels of
Fig. 10, where the empirical probability of return to the
origin is more scattered in the crash periods and after
that.
As in the previous section, investigation of the auto-
correlation function from both stocks might also be of
interest. The corresponding autocorrelation is shown in
Fig. 14. Although it is difficult to see how long the KLSE
stock maintains its correlation, the IHSG stock index
obviously becomes less correlated during and after the
crash. This result can be understood by looking back
to Fig. 12, i.e. after the crash the returns distribution
becomes more random and therefore the index losses its
memory.
It might be more interesting if we compare results in
this section with currency controls shown in the top pan-
els of Figs. 2 and 3. The government interventions on the
exchange rate seem to create non natural economics ac-
tivities which have a direct influence on the fluctuation of
stock indices. Once the currency is under-controlled, the
fluctuations tend to significantly deviate from the Gaus-
sian distribution, which can be clearly seen in the IHSG
moment before crash (Fig. 12) and the KLSE one after
crash (Fig. 13). From the investors point of view this
is obvious, a less fluctuating exchange rate reduces the
number of variables considered in estimating the future
stock price.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed the IHSG and KLSE stock index re-
turns using the methods developed for statistical physics.
In spite of the limited number of data used in our analy-
sis, we still found that both stock indices show the univer-
sal properties previously observed in the leading stocks
such as S&P 500 and NYSE, i.e. the scaling properties.
The difference is, nevertheless, found in the time scale,
the IHSG stock retains its scaling property longer than
the KLSE one. As a consequence, the former is more
correlated than the latter.
By investigating their statistical properties before, dur-
ing, and after the financial crash it is found that the
scaling behavior of the IHSG index originates from its
fluctuation before the crash period. During and after the
crash periods the index distributions are closer to Gaus-
sian and do not show a stable process. In the KLSE case,
the return distributions in all periods show an unstable
process and depart from Gaussian after the crash. One
possible explanation to these different behaviors could
be the currency control. Besides these differences, both
stock indices show some similarities, namely both stocks
become more volatile during and after the crash and their
return moments become closer to Gaussian during the
crash.
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